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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 960090-CA

vs.

Priority No. 15

R. Duane Layton,
Defendant/Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM ORDER STRIKING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, Circuit Court Judge

R. Duane Layton ("Layton"), appellee herein, respectfully requests that this Court
uphold the determination of the Third Circuit Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod
presiding, on such grounds as follow:
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(d), Utah Code
Annotated, (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the setting aside
of the Trial Court's Order, which entered default against plaintiff, and which granted
judgment to defendant on his counterclaim?
2. Whether failing to calendar and appear at a pretrial conference is a reason specified
in Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, e. g. mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect?
3. Whether the sanctions entered against Flanders & Associates were an appropriate
remedy in light of the failure to appear at a properly noticed pretrial conference and Rule
16(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
4. Is this appeal frivolous or brought for purpose of delay? Should damages be
awarded to Lay ton?
THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
For any question of fact, the standard of review in this appellate proceeding is abuse
of discretion.
The Circuit Court's decision regarding denial of the Motion to Set Aside is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard, Katz v. Pierce, et al, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986).
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION
IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or
pretrial order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or
pretrial conference, if a party or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared
to participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails to
2

participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may
make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others, any of the
orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any
other sanctions, the court shall require the party or the attorney representing
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any
noncompliance with this rule, including attorney fees, unless the court finds
that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust. (Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of
the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the
defendant has failed to appear in said actions; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
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Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions, the court shall similarly
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41 (b).
The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised
whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court an
objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a
motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties
to an issue of fact:
(1)
(2)
(3)

by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal is taken from the Order Striking Plaintiffs Complaint and Judgment by
Default, including but not limited to, the Court's Disposition Summary that denied
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, which was entered on December 15, 1995. There
have not been any motions filed pursuant to Rules (50)(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Course of Proceedings
The Statement of Course of Proceedings in Appellant's brief is correct with the
addition of the following to be included in Paragraph 7.
. . . 7. A pre-trial settlement conference was scheduled by the Court on September 19,
1995, at 9:30 a.m. Notice was sent to both parties. R. 23. Layton appeared and F & A failed
to appear at said pre-trial conference. The Court imposed sanctions. R. 26.. . .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On April 11, 1995, F & A, filed a complaint against Duane Layton ("Layton") for
breaching a representation agreement regarding legal services. R. 1.
2. On May 12, 1995, Layton filed an Answer and Counterclaim. R. 9.
3. On May 31, 1995, F & A filed a Reply to Counterclaim. R. 14.
4. On July 26, 1995, F & A filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial. R. 18.
5. On or about August 7, 1995, Layton filed an Objection to Readiness for Trial R.
21.
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6. On August 8, 1995, F & A filed its Response to Objection to Readiness for Trial.
R. 24.
7. A pre-trial settlement conference was scheduled by the Court on September 19,
1995, at 9:30 a.m. Notice was sent to both parties. R. 23. (Exhibit A).
8. Layton appeared at the pretrial, and F & A failed to appear. The Court imposed
sanctions by Striking F & A's Complaint and entering default on Layton's Counterclaim. R.
26.
9. On October 5, 1995, the Court entered the Order Striking Plaintiff's Complaint
and Judgment by Default. R. 28.
10. As a result of the lack of appearance by F & A, the Court ordered that F & A's
Complaint be stricken and dismissed with prejudice for failure to appear and entered a default
judgment on the Counterclaim against F & A, in the approximate amount of $2,000.00. R.
35.
11. The Disposition Summary was rendered on December 15, 1995, which found no
factual basis for alleged application of the rule. R 149. (Exhibit B)
12. F & A filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. R. 33.
13. The Court denied the Motion to Set Aside. R. 149.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. F & As failure to appear at the properly noticed pretrial conference was not mistake,
inadvertence or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) and the trial court did not err in denying the
motion to set aside the judgment filed.

6

- i-:r-:.!-'!-f' -,- ;.\civi;'.>n U) liraiit i>r U, r;\ Motions to Set

• • -M.
Aside Default Judgments.

3. The sanctions ordered by the trial court for F & A failure to appear at the properly
noticed pretrial conference were an-appropriate exen :i.se of ji idicial discretion pi irsi lai it tc R 1 ilc • 16
(d) Utah Rules of'Civil

Procedure.

I I lo fit iciii igs $ 'ei e i eqi lii eel i n idei R i lie 52 I txih 1 li It \s q / "Civil} V oa '.dur t " I he cii ci tit
court judge had no duty to find facts upoii all material issues submitted for decision because the
findings were waived pursuant tc)N.»J. V H -it-.* , : A A >, failure to appear and default.
5. I? & A is responsible for calendaring and aitendii: *: pre-trial and cannot claim
excusable neglect because of employees actions or failure to act.
6 lit itj'i istic ;e ai ic I u: I :* ; ji lity b

n i ,sl n ill it • = .si ill: si ic: I lid I " S: ' "s I *4otioi :i tc: S e t A s i d e tt I z

Default be granted.
/ I r \pp;\i!
Utah Rules of Appellate

:!i\oi*ui- I'I nrnnyiH h •;• purpose of delay as defined under Rule 3 3 ,
Procedure.
ARGUMENT I

THE CIRCUIT COTJRT APPROPRIATELY DENIED THE M O T I O N T O SET ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
It w a s not an abuse of discretion in; nu inal u m r t to refuse to set aside the Default and
Default Judgment under the factual circumstances present here.
N o substantial dispute exists as to the events which led to the entry of the Default, the
Defai lit Judgi i lent and the striking of I • & \ "s < :oi i lplaii: it I ' • & A failed to appeal" at a pi ( >pei ly
noticed pretrial conference. Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
7

provides that

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or
proceeding for the following reasons; (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect;. . .(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment.
The law in this jurisdiction relating to the standard of review on the refusal of a trial court
to set aside a default judgment is well settled. Airkin Intermountain, Inc. v ParkerA 30 Utah 2d
65, 513 P. 2d 429 (1973), contains a succinct expression of that standard. In that opinion, the
court states:
For this court to overturn the discretion of the lower court in refusing to vacate a
valid judgment, the requirement of public policy demand more than a mere
statement that a person did not have his day in court when full opportunity for a
fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal representative. The movant must
show that he used due diligence and that he was precluded from appearing by
circumstances over which he had not control. (Citation omitted, emphasis in
original).
The only excuse for the failure to appear offered by F & A was that they were
experiencing a staffing change and that the matter was not properly calendared. This is neglect,
but not excusable neglect as required by the rule. The trial court in denying F & A's Motion to
Set Aside the Default Judgment and stating that "no factual basis alleged for application of the
rule," determined that F & A had not used due diligence and that F & A was not prevented by
circumstances over which it had no control. [Exhibit B].
When a motion to vacate a default judgment is based on excusable neglect, trial court
must consider and resolve question of excusable neglect prior to it consideration of issue whether
meritorious defense exists; furthermore, it is unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate to even
consider issue of meritorious defense unless court is satisfied that sufficient excuse has been

8

st urn n Statt ? B)? i im I 7 'hr -: u qh t JU ih State * Dei }t °) & * zu il Sei i ices v " I :;! uss* ;/m< m, 66 5 IE 2d 1053
(Utah 1983).
I ; & i. V'"s Bi ief ii \ RGt JIN 1EI I I I and the A D D E N D l Jl- I attempts to address the issue of
meritorious defense, none of which should be considered on this appeal because the

Musselman

standard has not been met.
A R G I I M E N T II
TRIAL COURTS ARE VESTED WITH CONSIDERABLE
D I S C R E T I O N TO G R A N T O R
D
O N S TO S E T A S I D E D E F A l J I T
This conn has recently recognized the trial court's discretionary power in the case of
Miller v. BrocksmithA

N. ^ iJ. 2d 6°0 fUftih \pp mo-n

TUJS c o u r t

held " A trial court's ruling on

a motion to set aside a default involves the trial court's discretionary powei i ind we w ill :t lot
disturb the trial court's decision in such matters absent a clear abuse of such discretion." at p.
693.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Katz v. Pierce, et al, 732 P. 2d 92 (Utah
I V M ) i ,....; : J . k. ,\s u;iiv)WS:

The District court judge is vested with considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in
granting or denying a motion to set aside a judgment. State ex rel Utah State
Department of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 p 2d 1053 (Utah 1983); Airken
Intermountain, Inc v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P. 2d 429 (1973). The court
should be generally indulgent toward setting a judgment aside where there is
reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to answer and when
timely application is made. Where there is doubt about whether a default should
be set aside, that doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so. But, before we
will interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion, abuse of that discretion
must be clearly shown. Russell v. Martell, 681 P. 2d 1193 (Utah 1984). That
some basis may exist to set aside the default does not require the conclusion that
the court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and circumstances
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support the refusal. Cf. Wilson v. Miller, 198 Kan. 321, 424 P.2d 271, 273 (1967)
at p. 93.
The decision of the trial court does not exhibit an abuse of discretion that would justify
reversal. The trial court's decision exhibits an appropriate exercise of discretion consistent with
the controlling principle adopted by this court.
ARGUMENT IH
THE CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED SANCTIONS
UNDER RULE 16 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The undisputed facts show that this is simply a case involving a failure to attend a properly
noticed pretrial conference and the imposition of sanctions as provided for in Rule 16 (d), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states as follows:
If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if no
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a
party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the
conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the
court, upon motion or its own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto
as are just, and among others, any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b) (2) (B),
(C),(D). . . .
The sanctions imposed by the court on F & A in this matter were to strike its complaint
and to enter a default on Layton's counterclaim both of which are specifically provided for in
Rule 37(b)(2) (C), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as follows: "(Q an order striking out
pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the
disobedient party;"

Although these sanctions of striking the complaint of F & A and entering judgment by
default on Layton's counterclaim are severe penalties, this is not an abuse of the courts discretion.
Generally courts have been reluctant to impose such harsh penalties because to do so unduly
10

penalizes a litigant foi 1:1 le i leglect oi oi i iissioi i of 1 lis attoi i 1 :::) I lowever, in this case tiu- attorney
and the litigant are one in the same and no inequity or injustice results.
i \ A u. Lm .hat striking its complaint was a dismissal under Rule 41 (b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. It was not. As stated above the striking of the com p = <'•

'

:

m-y

of default and default judgment were an appropriate exercise of the courts authority under Rule

ARGUMENT IV
FINDINGS » \ RE REQUIRED UNDER RULE 52 I I I AH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDlIRE
F & A argue that failure of the trial court to make findings of all material issues is
reversible error, and relies upon KU. /<__. i ;dn Kules nfCi\

Procedure for this proposition.

However, the language of Rule 52(c) (1) is dispositive of this issue. It states as follows: "(c)
Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of
aons of ..

parties to ai i issi le of fact: (1) b> defai ill oi by

failing to appear at the trial;"

F & A's failure to appear at the pretrial and the entry of the default waived any
requirement for fii.il;;.;' ^ -Hidings were required which we believe they were not.

11

ARGUMENT V
ATTORNEY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTS OF EMPLOYEES

The only excuse that F & A has raised for failing to appear at the properly noticed pretrial
conference is that they were experiencing some staffing changes and the secretary did not get this
hearing on its calendar.
It is well established that work done by secretaries and other lay persons is done as agents
of the lawyer employing them and the lawyer must supervise their work and be responsible for
their work product or lack of it. State v. Caenen, 235 Kan. 451, 681 P. 2d 639 (1984).
Although negligence on part of counsel may, in appropriate cases, be deemed "excusable
neglect" for purpose of setting aside default judgment, negligence on part of one of the parties or
its employees cannot be excused. Wagner Equipment Co. v. Mountain states Mineral
Enterprises, Inc., 669 P. 2d 625 (Colo. App 1983). F & A may use this as an excuse, but it does
not rise to the level of "excusable neglect" or "inadvertence" as required by law to set aside a
default under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT VI
INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY TO LAYTON SHALL RESULT
SHOULD F & A S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BE GRANTED.
Layton appeared in the trial court Pro Se, and has until this Brief attempted to represent
himself against F & A, licensed attorneys. However, due to the complexities of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure and this court, Layton has been forced to obtain counsel to assist with
finally resolving this matter at this court.
12

In '

i J 111 1 pili nib, inn.in in illou an . m o m n to continue to harass and cause undue

emotional and financial hardship upon a prior client by setting aside this judgment. The facts in
this matter are clear. Layton took time off from work to appear and the attorneys (F & A) failed
to apre-:- .* * -'retrial conference. Both parties had notice c f the conseqi lences of tl lei r faili ire to
appear and must be subject to the sanctions imposed To do otherwise would be an injustice and
i i icqi lit) ir to I aj !:c i i
ARGUMENT VII
THIS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS OR FOR

PURPOSE

OF DELAY,

AS DEFINED UNDER RULE 33, UTA HRULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDl RE
It is apparent livm (he undisputed facts tlui ihis appeal is not grounded in fact. Further,
the existing law is cieai

.:,:• area and i • x ,\ \US not made arguments, good faith or otherwise,

to extend, modify, or reverse the existing law. It appears this appeal has been brought to further
harass Layton, delay his judgment and collection thereof, to gain an unfair advantage of a pro se
hu^ai

;;i ease I ,a> ton' s costs « ' ...

purposes under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

3 ,(

- i

Accordingly, Layton respectfully

reqi lests tl lat tl le t :;: i n I: i • 'ai ( 1 dai i: lages foi dot ible tl ie costs allowed i \mu-v me provisions oi Kiue
34, Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure.
CONCLUSION

F & A has not satisfied the requirements of Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Counsels failure to appear at the properly noticed pretrial conference was not inadvertence or
exci isable neglet ;t I o alio ; ai I attoi i ie> to a > 'oid tl leii legal responsibilities and thei i seek to set
aside judgments at this court constitutes a great injustice to Layton and should not be granted.
13

The Circuit Court did not commit reversible error by not entering findings in this matter. This
appeal is frivolous and brought for purposes of delay only and damages should be awarded.
WHEREFORE, Layton respectfully requests that this Court uphold the denial of the
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, and award Layton attorneys fees, damages and costs to defend
this action and grant such further relief as the court deems just and proper.
DATED this /3_ day of July, 1996.

SHAUNA L. KERR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
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ng Brief of

Appellee on the following, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
BRENDA L. FLANDERS
FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES
56 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111

*£&>&-*
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ORDER FOR( E-TRIAL SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCE AND FOR APPEARANCE
OF COUNSEL
(read carefully)

Plaintiff
VS.

R . hM/V. Ul\lW\
Honorable

CIVIL NO. "VoOcmOlOtyJ
J u d g e S t e p h e n L.

Henriod

The court, on its own motion, hereby orders that a pre-trial settlement conference be held in the above
entitled case as follows:
DATE:

Qrpfcrnhf.riq^^

PLACE: 77i;Vtf grc///7 Gwr/. S.L DepU
Fifth Floor, Judges chambers

TIME:

^• 3 0 i i m _ _

ADDRESS: 451 South 200 Easf
SLC. Ut 84111

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD BE IN ATTENDANCE UNLESS
PRIOR TO SAID CONFERENCE, THE COURT EXCUSES THE APPEARANCE OF ANY PARTY, THIS
INCLUDES DEFENDANTS WHO ARE REPRRSENTED BY INSURANCE COMPANY COUNSEL. Corporate
parties should be represented by a responsible officer authorized to personally make decisions for the settlement of
the case. The attorney who will try the case shall attend unless excused for good cause shown. Every attorney has a
duty to be thoroughly familiar with the relevant evidence and must be authorized to personally settle the case.
If counsels) are unable to meet the scheduled time, the counsel(s) are directed to contact the Judge or his/her
clerk as soon as the fact is known and a time convenient to all will be arranged. The responsibility of contacting other
parties receiving the notice to arrange such a change in schedule will be that of the person requesting the change.
The purpose of the conference is to effect a settlement of the case. Attorney's are directed to discuss
settlement with their clients and each other prior to the appearance at the settlement conference, to be realistic in their
approach to settlement and to be prepared to advise the Judge of their efforts towards settlement and the problems
involved. If a settlement is agreed upon prior to the conference, counsel is directed to prepare a stipulation of
settlement to present at or prior to the conference, or to appear and present such settlement into the record.
Other problems such as withdrawal of counsel, failure to respond to discovery, witness problems, trial
conflict, requests for continuances, etc., wiJl be resolved at the conference. Motions for summary judgment will not
be heard.
If counsel fails to appear or it settlement efforts are thwarted by the non-appearance of a party, attorney's fee
may be allowed to opposing parties and the court may enter a default against the non-appearing party or what ever
other sanctions seem just and appropriate.
Copi&TSf this notice were mailed to the following parties at the addresses indicated:

Kwa%t3iBcf2
BY: VJ .oun J YxhjL>
MMd
I- RanditL
\>.f\'.ont knjJan
Cknft-C.
'^axu.ndoz
0.f). fioK' ^-335
3fe past ^rcadiucuj fin tt^vd
DATED:
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jLJtuuKxjr 1KUU1T COURT, S T A ^ OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
DISPOSITION SUMMARY

Case#_^lMMLtV
The «A plaintiffs

•

defendants

Motion fV/to 0j}\ (Xn7](h1 [d'M/xllrfr
v
as follows.
J Kj

has been decided

K

Denied

•

Granted

H

ATP/PLA tc prepare oi dei

Q

ATD/DEF to prepare order

Comments:

/frj

Ajj^U^

rf^^^Gfa&^n.

A*S tJ^J^jf
<rf

r"w

f*7

sujtLe .

Date: /2>>-/<rh <f~
ST*

...,_% tfeCtostOast,.9teteo»
wum,
>-»^> v^"« vwynSaflilate Department cto fnsfey
UtotTssit
corti^U%l^i9^ntit%a^ 39c) foregoing is a true a r t feH
copy of^^^^Mg^kni
on file In my office a$ mteh

Stephen L. Henriod
Third Circuit Court Judge

Witness my haft* and seal of said Court This i & •
day of
L=J^jL^kt£kii^
_ _ 19 /£

Deputy
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